The interplay of politics, economics and culture in news framing of Middle East wars by Melki, Jad
Media, War & Conflict
2014, Vol. 7(2) 165 –186
© The Author(s) 2014
Reprints and permissions: 
sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: 10.1177/1750635214537405
mwc.sagepub.com
MWC
The interplay of politics, 
economics and culture in  
news framing of Middle  
East wars
Jad Melki
American University of Beirut, Lebanon
Abstract
A significant part of a modern war entails the struggle over news frames to influence public 
opinion. Studying these news frames in a comparative international context may offer insights into 
the factors behind frame construction. The 2006 Lebanon–Israel war offers a well-defined case 
for such comparative study. This study examined how mainstream Arab, Israeli and US television 
networks framed the conflict. It found strong regional framing trends explained as an outcome of 
the interplay of political, economic and cultural factors that confined each network’s journalistic 
practices. The trends revealed a strong correlation between Israeli and US news framing, with 
some exceptions, and a division between two Arab media camps, both of which generally offered 
framing supportive of Hezbollah.
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Introduction
In July 2006, war raged between the Lebanese Hezbollah party and the Israeli army, 
killing over 1100 Lebanese and 159 Israelis, wounding thousands, displacing almost a 
million Lebanese and half-a-million Israelis, and destroying tens of thousands of homes, 
factories, and bridges, in addition to billions of dollars in economic loss and immense 
environmental damage (BBC News, 2006). The 34-day war dominated international 
news (Kalb and Saivetz, 2007) and presented a well-defined case of asymmetrical 
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warfare, where a guerilla group effectively resisted the onslaught of a stronger more 
advanced army, and where media coverage and propaganda efforts significantly affected 
the outcome (Lyons, 2008; Pahlavi, 2007). The war was an important juncture in the 
Arab–Israeli conflict. Not only did Hezbollah claim victory over its nemesis – even cit-
ing an official Israeli investigation that concluded Israel ‘failed to win’ (The Independent, 
2008) – but it also touted a new deterrence arrangement. Even today, the 2006 war con-
tinues to influence regional policy and make news, as manifested in recurring Israeli 
military trainings and political statements that anticipate the next war, followed by coun-
ter Hezbollah threats and announcements boasting the new post-2006 status quo.
During the conflict, mainstream news played a significant role in shaping perceptions 
towards the fighting sides (Rill and Davis, 2008), which consequently affected diplo-
matic efforts and outcomes. While some went as far as claiming the media in this war 
became ‘a weapon of modern warfare’ (Kalb and Saivetz, 2007: 43), others leveled accu-
sations of biased reporting, as is the case in every Arab–Israeli conflict (Gaber et al., 
2009). Analysts claimed the news varied considerably from one region to another, that 
different audiences were watching different wars (Goodman and Gonzalez, 2006).
However, only few studies have analyzed this war’s news coverage, particularly in a 
transnational comparative fashion, not to mention that even these few studies have been 
subject to accusations of bias (Lamb, 2007). Therefore, this study attempts to fill a gap 
in the literature through a comparative content analysis of 11 TV networks (six Arab, one 
Israeli, and four American) that covered the war. It examines regional framing trends, 
particularly differences between US, Arab, and Israeli framing, and discusses the politi-
cal, economic, and cultural factors that contributed to such framing.
This comparative approach has significant theoretical implications on questions of 
state and political influences on news framing. Herman and Chomsky’s (2002) propa-
ganda model suggests that US news coverage will overall favor Israel, but does this 
preclude any divergences, or do US media always give a ‘pass’ to Israel (Novak, 2006), 
even if Israeli media themselves ask critical questions? Similarly, does the indexing 
hypothesis – which argues that national news framing tends to correlate with and is lim-
ited to the range of debate among the political elite (Bennett, 1990; Bennett and Manheim, 
1993) – apply to news systems outside the US? Or do other variables, such as ‘national 
interest, national journalistic culture and editorial policy of each news organization’ and 
the broader political and social context better explain the factors that influence news 
framing (Archetti, 2008: 17), particularly in Arab countries. Moreover, can we speak of 
an ‘Arab media’ the same way we speak of a ‘US media’ when it comes to news frames 
pertaining to the historical Arab–Israeli conflict? Or do distinct Arab countries offer sig-
nificant differences in their news output? Scholars have often lumped Arab media 
together assuming they ‘operate in collusion with a reigning regional power to maintain 
the … illusion of solidarity among Arab states … they fuel calumny toward the perpetra-
tors of their common “victimization,” … Israel and the United States’ (USIP, 2005: 3). 
This perception often ignores innate disputes between and within Arab states and how 
these disputes produce competing news discourses that reflect the clashing political and 
economic interests, as well as the diverse national journalistic cultures of this region. 
Finally, recent scholarship on Arab media has obsessively focused on al-Jazeera, as if it 
represents all Arab media (Kraidy and Khalil, 2009). Using news framing analysis, this 
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study compares the news framing of US, Arab and Israeli media, questions the assumed 
homogeneity of Arab media output, and examines the news framing of several prominent 
Arab news networks (including al-Jazeera), which attract significant audiences in 
Lebanon and the Arab region.
News framing analysis offers an appropriate theoretical framework for comparing 
news coverage across and within countries. Goffman (1974: 10) defined frames as ‘prin-
ciples of organization which govern events … and our subjective involvement in them’. 
While Goffman’s conception explains framing as unconscious adoptions of meaning, 
most contemporary scholars view framing as intentional constructions of reality, or at 
least constructions influenced by dominant structures and processes (D’Angelo, 2002). 
According to Entman (1993), framing entails the selection, highlighting, and communi-
cating of certain aspects of a perceived reality, which offers a certain interpretation of an 
event, attaches to it a particular moral logic, and suggests a specific solution – a defini-
tion this study adopts. This is particularly relevant in mainstream news production, where 
newsroom processes, professional norms, and wider social and political factors influence 
the construction of news reports, and therefore the framing of reality to vast audiences.
Gamson and Modigliani (1989: 3) explained a frame is ‘a central organizing idea … 
for making sense of relevant events, suggesting what is at issue’. This central organizing 
idea becomes most critical for contested and muddled events, such as international con-
flicts, particularly for distant audiences, since a significant part of any conflict entails the 
struggle over framing the issues to influence public policy and opinion (Norris et al., 
2003). Paramount is the issue of frame selection, since framing is essentially a method 
‘of organizing otherwise fragmentary pieces of information in a thematic way that facili-
tates news gathering, news production, and … audience comprehension’ (Whitney et al., 
2004: 405).
In international affairs, framing sets the news agenda by highlighting specific events 
as international problems and ignoring others. It primes the arguments by identifying the 
culprit, and assesses the situation by recommending particular solutions (Norris et al., 
2003). What’s more, ‘frames are rarely neutral or value free, not chosen by chance. They 
open the way to manipulation of news by interested parties.’ This has strong implications 
for public opinion and the outcome of a conflict.
Most studies that examined the news coverage of the 2006 war focused exclusively 
on Israeli, US, or British media. Only a few compared the reporting. In fact, the war 
stimulated the interest of many Israeli scholars who, unlike their Arab counterparts, pro-
duced a wealth of publications that critiqued many aspects of Israeli media’s perfor-
mance. These studies consistently found Israeli media to be fervently supportive of the 
war effort, in addition to using news frames that concealed the war’s ugly realities, its 
victims, and its cost, and that precluded moral questions from surfacing, thereby justify-
ing Israel’s war project.
Analyzing thousands of items from Israeli newscasts and newspapers, Dor et al. 
(2007) found the coverage completely supportive and uncritical of Israel. The study 
found Israeli media ignored covering flaws and inconsistencies in Israel’s claimed objec-
tives and justifications for going to war, presented a fictitiously strong image of Israeli 
leaders, disregarded the differences in their opinions, and overlooked failures to protect 
Israeli civilians. It ‘almost entirely separated’ Israeli military actions from the vast 
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destruction in Lebanon and extensive killing and suffering of its civilian population. The 
rare criticism that appeared, ‘with almost no exceptions, resulted from the declared and 
unequivocal media support for the war’. In fact, the criticism called for ‘harsher’ and 
‘more massive damage to Lebanon’ (p. 69). Consistently, Neiger et al. (2010) found 
Israeli media contained little journalistic criticism. Throughout the war, less than 12 per 
cent of the news was critical, and even less than a quarter of this criticism was ‘challeng-
ing criticism’, while the rest was ‘reaffirming criticism’, or criticism ‘that was supportive 
of the war efforts, sometimes even encouraging belligerent actions’ (p. 391).
Gavriely-Nuri and Balas (2010) focused on the framing of the Israeli military and civil-
ian casualties. They found Israeli television used ‘annihilating framing’ when covering 
wounded soldiers, which represented war and injuries as positive experiences, while blur-
ring their harsher features, excluding the suffering, and instead focusing on successful res-
cue stories. In contrast, the coverage of wounded civilians complied with the ‘victim code’ 
frame, where the injured innocent person faced a sudden, harsh, and externally imposed 
reality. Accordingly, this framing served to preserve the image of the undefeatable Israeli 
male figure, while emphasizing the victimization of Israeli citizens, thereby legitimizing 
the use of military force. Similarly, Gavriely-Nuri (2008) found that Israeli media employed 
metaphorical annihilation and four dominant war-normalizing metaphors. The ‘war is 
women’s work’ metaphor transformed the war from the public to the private into an exten-
sion of housework tasks that are free of aggression. The ‘war is a medicine’ metaphor 
depicted Hezbollah as a disease that must be purified and stressed the military’s physician-
like qualities. The ‘war is sport’ metaphor trivialized the loss and destruction, and the ‘war 
is business’ metaphor turned the war into a rational economic transaction. This concealed 
the dire consequences of the war and normalized it as a commonplace act.
Studies examining US news found it to be generally favorable to Israel, particularly 
local news, but some studies found the coverage was balanced with a tilt against Israel. 
For example, Cavari and Gabay (2010), who compared US local and network news, 
found that local newscasts were more supportive of Israel and more often portrayed 
Hezbollah as an aggressor terrorist organization. In contrast, the networks offered some 
criticism of Israel, were generally balanced, and referred to Hezbollah as a militia. 
Moreover, local news more consistently echoed US government positions, which pre-
dominantly supported Israel.
Bahador (2008) investigated if a ‘CNN effect’ occurred in the aftermath of the ‘Qana 
massacre’, in which an Israeli airstrike killed many Lebanese civilians. Analyzing US 
networks and government press releases, the study found that negative and positive 
frames of Israel were relatively balanced immediately before and after the Qana attack, 
but damaging frames significantly increased the day of the attack. A spike in coverage on 
that day followed by an increase in government releases and a short-term change in tone 
toward Israel provided some evidence for the CNN effect.
Examining photos in news magazines, Mascagni (2008) found US photojournalistic 
accounts of the war evoked Muslim stereotypes and a western narrative of victimization 
that calls for US interference as rescuers in the region. The photos promoted US foreign 
policy’s support for Israel and portrayed Hezbollah as a terrorist group. Images of vic-
tims were predominantly of women, which resonates with the ‘narrative that women 
from the Middle East need saving from their masculine Muslim counterparts’ (p. 8). The 
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images also implied proportional victimization on both sides, which the death-toll fig-
ures contradicted. Finally, the captions labeled Hezbollah as extremists and aggressors, 
Israelis as defenders, and Americans as peacemakers.
Studies centering on British media examined the objectivity of the coverage and con-
cluded that it was largely balanced with a slight tilt in Israel’s favor. Gaber et al. (2009) 
investigated the validity of pro-Israel lobbyists’ accusations that the BBC was biased 
against Israel. Comparing 228 reports from the BBC and ITV, the study found that both 
broadcasters offered relatively impartial reporting, and ‘if there was any bias it was 
towards, rather than against, Israel’ (p. 239). In reference to casualties, ‘there was in fact 
a pro-Israeli bias in coverage by both the BBC and ITV’ (p. 246). In addition, both broad-
casters offered more time to pro-Israeli voices than to pro-Lebanese/Hezbollah voices. 
Nevertheless, BBC achieved near-equality between Israel and Lebanon/Hezbollah in 
regard to the point-of-views of its news reports, whereas ITV offered a bias against 
Israel. Drawing similar conclusions, Parry (2010) compared press photography framing 
in The Times and The Guardian. Through a visual framing analysis of 211 photos, the 
study found both newspapers’ images were primarily of civilians and emphasized human 
loss and injury, particularly those of Lebanese civilians. Still, both newspapers generally 
portrayed Hezbollah as mysterious extremist guerillas, and military images were pre-
dominantly those of Israeli personnel and hardware. Images from The Guardian were 
more graphic, showed more empathy toward Lebanese civilians, and utilized an Israeli 
culpability for death and destruction frame more often. Conversely, The Times balanced 
images of civilian casualties supportive of Israel with those supportive of Lebanon, but 
had a greater share of ‘heroism/empathy of Israeli soldiers’ and ‘Hezbollah aggression’ 
images (p. 80). The study noted that despite The Times’ seemingly balanced display of 
civilian images of Israelis and Lebanese, the equal number of depictions of civilian casu-
alties for both sides belies the newspaper’s own numbers of disproportionate death and 
destruction that were significantly higher on the Lebanese side.
At the multinational level, studies that compared international media coverage 
reached inconsistent conclusions. Some found a global media bias against Israel, while 
others found significant differences between western and non-western media. Kalb and 
Saivetz (2007) found the coverage differed substantially from one region to another. 
Whereas Arab media favored Hezbollah, the BBC and US media tried to be balanced, but 
overall tipped against Israel. The study found both Arab and western media repeatedly 
asserted Israel’s disproportionate response to Hezbollah’s provocation, portrayed Israel 
as the aggressor, and evoked the ‘traditional Arab feelings of “victimization”’ (p. 51). 
The study based some of its conclusions on Schatz and Kolmer (2006), which examined 
four news programs on two public German television stations and found their coverage 
biased. Most started their stories in Lebanon and presented Israel as the perpetrator of 
disproportionate violence and Lebanese civilians as the victims. In addition, Hezbollah’s 
fighters and attacks, and Israeli victims rarely appeared, and the programs offered lim-
ited justifications for Israel’s actions, which were portrayed negatively. In addition, 
Yaghoobi (2009) compared the discourse of Newsweek and the Iranian Kayhan 
International (KI). The study found that the publications constructed two opposing sys-
tems of beliefs that reflected each country’s foreign policies. KI portrayed ‘Zionists’ as 
the violent perpetrators and Hezbollah as the victim, whereas Newsweek vilified 
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Hezbollah and defended Israel. Both publications used passivization and nominalization 
in their reports, thereby concealing both the perpetrator and the victim of violence.
In sum, although a significant number of studies examined the news framing of the 
2006 war, overall they offered few, if any, consistent conclusions, and many lacked scope. 
Studies examining Israeli media framing consistently concluded that their reporting was 
uncritically supportive of the Israeli government and its war project. In addition, the stud-
ies revealed Israeli news framing helped justify the war project by concealing its ugly 
realities and precluding moral questions from surfacing. Studies examining British media 
found the coverage to be mainly balanced with a slight tilt in Israel’s favor, although these 
studies seemed too defensive and apparently aimed to justify some British media’s news 
coverage during that period. More problematic, objectivity and bias in news coverage 
were benchmarked against other British media, instead of international media. The same 
was true for some studies that analyzed US news, where for example local and national 
network news were compared. Given that each of the US and British media belong to a 
specific media system, it is likely that the factors that influence one news institution also 
influence the others, and therefore all these news institutions may fall on one side of the 
spectrum and only differ marginally. A more plausible comparison would be at the multi-
national level, including comparison to the coverage of two assumed extremes: Israeli 
media, which predictably should offer the most biased pro-Israel framing, and Hezbollah’s 
media, which should present the most biased pro-Hezbollah framing. Then the rest of the 
compared news outlets would be located within this two-dimensional spectrum. However, 
even the few studies that did examine international news drew disparate conclusions, a 
matter this study aims to resolve by offering a multinational analysis and including both 
Israeli and Hezbollah’s media, in addition to analyzing a host of Arab and Lebanese 
media, which were largely ignored in most of the literature.
Therefore, this study explores the following research questions that examine the 
meta-frames present in the coverage, the dominant tone toward each side, who was 
blamed for initiating war, and who was framed as the victor. These questions focus on 
critical aspects of the coverage that may benefit one side or the other in the conflict, and 
therefore help us better understand in which direction each news network tended to lean.
RQ1: How did Arab, US, and Israeli mainstream TV networks compare in framing 
the 2006 war, and what political, economic and cultural factors may explain their 
framing?
RQ1a: What meta-frames dominated the TV networks coverage?
RQ1b: What were the dominant tones toward Israel and Hezbollah?
RQ1c: From which side did the main sources come and what were their tones toward 
Israel and Hezbollah.
RQ1d: Which side was mainly blamed for the causing the war?
RQ1e: Which side was mainly designated as the winner and loser?
Methodology
The study used quantitative content analysis. It analyzed 963 TV newscast reports ran-
domly sampled from the primetime newscasts of 11 TV networks. These included two 
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pan-Arab networks: al-Jazeera (n = 74) and al-Arabiya (n = 65); five US networks: ABC 
(n = 92), NBC (n = 100), CBS (n = 85), and CNN (n = 113): four domestic Lebanese 
stations: al-Jadeed (n = 88), Future (n = 78), LBC (n = 93), and Hezbollah’s al-Manar (n 
= 60); and Israel’s Channel 2 (n = 115).
The study defined a unit of analysis as a complete news story that began with the 
anchor’s introduction and ended with the reporter’s (or anchor’s) sign-off. All available 
news reports broadcast between 12 July and 15 August 2006 that addressed the war were 
collected and then randomly sampled to include at least one and up to three stories per 
day from each newscast. The sampling frames of US and Israeli newscasts were the most 
comprehensive and complete. They included all newscasts broadcast during that period 
(US newscasts were accessed through Vanderbilt University’s online news archives, 
while Israeli newscasts were accessed though the station’s online database). With the 
exception of Hezbollah’s al-Manar, Arab and Lebanese media’s sampling frames were 
also relatively comprehensive, as they were acquired from IPSOS Stat, a market research 
company that monitors and archives Arab televisions. Because al-Manar was frequently 
targeted during the war, some of its newscasts were missing.
The codebook consisted of 32 variables that measured several aspects of the coverage. 
Only 13 variables directly related to the research questions above were used in this article 
(see Appendix). These variables measured the dominant meta-frames in the news stories 
(RQ1a), the dominant tone of each news story toward Israel and Hezbollah (RQ1b), the 
sources used in sound bites and their tones toward Israel and Hezbollah (RQ1c), the 
assignment of blame for causing the war (RQ1d), and the portrayal of the winner and loser 
(RQ1e). These variables were based on studies that analyzed similar news events, such as 
Pippa et al. (2003) and Wilhelm (2005). They were measured at the nominal or ordinal 
levels and followed established content analysis conventions (Riff, 2005).
Coders were fluent in Arabic, English, and/or Hebrew and conducted the coding over 
a 12-month period. To ensure inter-coder reliability, coders were rigorously trained until 
a 0.80 coder reliability coefficient was achieved. Later, a random sample of 10 percent of 
the news reports was double-coded and assessed using Krippendorff’s Alpha (K-alpha), 
which resulted in an overall average consistency coefficient of 0.83 (0.71–0.98). All 
variables exceeded the minimum acceptable rate of 0.67, and most exceeded the recom-
mended 0.80 (Krippendorff, 2004). Using SPSS, variables relevant to the research ques-
tions were analyzed through frequency tables, cross tabulations, and a chi square 
inferential statistic (p ≤ 0.05).
The study exhibited two main weaknesses. Access to all the newscasts, particularly 
local Lebanese and Israeli stations, was difficult. In addition, the need to include a large 
number of coders – needed to analyze news material in three languages – is usually dis-
couraged in content analysis.
Results
Dominant meta-frames
RQ1a measured the news reports’ dominant meta-frames. It asked which side’s perspec-
tive is most prominent. The four meta-frames tracked were Lebanon-centered, Israel-
centered, internationally-centered, and other-country-centered (K-alpha = 0.82).
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The results presented strong regional trends (Table 1). Israel’s CH2 offered the least 
Lebanon-centered meta-frames, followed closely by all US newscasts, while Arab sta-
tions, especially Hezbollah’s al-Manar, offered the most. In contrast, CH2 offered the 
most Israel-centered meta-frames, followed closely by US newscasts, and Arab news-
casts offered the least. In sum, US networks largely corresponded with Israel’s CH2, and 
Arab networks correlated with Hezbollah’s al-Manar.
Tone toward Israel and Hezbollah
RQ1b measured the explicit and predominant tone of the news coverage toward Israel 
(K-alpha = 0.72) and Hezbollah (K-alpha = 0.71). Strong regional trends emerged again 
(Table 2). CH2 offered the most sympathetic coverage toward Israel, while al-Manar 
(and al-Jadeed) offered none. US newscasts had significantly more stories sympathetic 
to Israel than Arab newscasts, which had very few. In contrast, al-Manar offered the 
most critical coverage of Israel, while CH2 offered the least. With the exception of al-
Arabiya, Arab newscasts offered significantly more critical coverage of Israel than did 
US newscasts.
Similar regional trends appeared when comparing the tone toward Hezbollah 
(Table 3). Al-Manar and al-Jadeed offered the most sympathetic coverage toward 
Hezbollah, while all other stations, with the exception of al-Jazeera, had very few sto-
ries sympathetic to Hezbollah. While on average US newscasts had fewer sympathetic 
stories than Arab newscasts, two interesting trends emerged. First, Arab newscasts dif-
fered significantly, with al-Arabiya, Future, and LBC offering significantly fewer sym-
pathetic stories than al-Jazeera and al-Jadeed. Second, US newscasts offered equal or 
even fewer reports sympathetic to Hezbollah than did CH2. In contrast, al-Manar had 
no stories critical of Hezbollah, while CH2 had the most. In addition, US newscasts 
offered relatively the same level of critical coverage as CH2. Also, Arab newscasts 
Table 1. Dominant meta-frames.
Newscast Lebanon Israel International Other
n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%)
ABC 27 29 38 41 7 8 20 22
NBC 33 33 37 37 8 8 22 22
CBS 22 26 33 39 9 11 21 25
CNN 35 31 58 51 10 9 10 9
CH2 15 13 97 84 2 2 1 1
Al-Manar 50 83 10 17 0 0 0 0
Al-Jadeed 76 86 6 7 6 7 0 0
LBC 53 57 13 14 22 24 5 5
Future 56 72 7 9 11 14 4 5
Al-Arabiya 39 60 11 17 7 11 8 12
Al-Jazeera 43 58 20 27 3 4 8 11
p = 0.0.
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offered significantly fewer critical stories, although LBC, Future, and al-Arabiya 
offered significantly more critical stories than al-Jazeera and al-Jadeed.
Sources and tones of sound bites
RQ1c tracked Israeli, Lebanese, and Hezbollah sources in the first three sound bites of 
each news report (K-alpha = 0.94). It also examined their tones toward Israel (K-alpha = 
0.86) and Hezbollah (K-alpha = 0.85). The newscasts comparison revealed strong 
regional trends (Table 4). The vast majority of CH2’s sound bites came from Israeli 
sources. US newscasts used Israeli sources significantly more than Arab newscasts. In 
contrast, Arab newscasts used Lebanese sources significantly more than US newscasts. 
Israel’s CH2 offered the least percentage of Lebanese and Hezbollah sources, while al-
Manar offered the most Hezbollah sources. Arab newscasts were divided in using 
Hezbollah sources. Al-Jadeed and al-Jazeera used Hezbollah sources significantly more 
than Future, al-Arabiya, and LBC, which used them at the same level as US newscasts.
As for the tone of these sound bites (Table 5), CH2’s sound bites were the most sym-
pathetic and the least critical of Israel, while al-Manar’s were the most critical and the 
least sympathetic. US newscasts had significantly more sound bites sympathetic to Israel 
than Arab newscast, while Arab newscasts had significantly more sound bites critical of 
Israel than US newscasts.
Similar regional trends emerged when comparing sound bites sympathetic but not 
those critical of Hezbollah (Table 6). Al-Manar had the most sympathetic and least criti-
cal sound bites. CH2 had the most critical and very few sympathetic sound bites. 
Similarly, US networks had the same level of critical and sympathetic sound bites as 
CH2, although ABC and CNN had even fewer sympathetic sound bites than CH2. Arab 
networks differed significantly. While collectively they offered more sympathetic sound 
bites than Israeli and US networks, al-Jadeed and al-Jazeera had significantly more 
Table 2. Tone toward Israel.
Newscast Sympathetic Neither/nor Critical
n (%) n (%) n (%)
ABC 24 28 36 42 26 30
NBC 21 23 41 46 28 31
CBS 14 17 42 52 25 31
CNN 27 24 65 59 19 17
CH2 65 60 32 30 11 10
Al-Manar 0 0 6 10 52 90
Al-Jadeed 0 0 14 17 68 83
LBC 6 8 32 42 39 51
Future 2 3 19 28 48 70
Al-Arabiya 5 9 31 53 22 38
Al-Jazeera 2 3 27 41 37 56
p = 0.0.
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sympathetic sound bites than al-Arabia, Future, and LBC. However, when it came to 
sound bites critical of Hezbollah, Future and al-Arabiya had significantly fewer critical 
sound bites than LBC, al-Jazeera, and al-Jadeed, each of which had more critical sound 
bites than even any US newscast.
Assigning blame
RQ1d assessed who was explicitly blamed for causing the war (K-alpha = 0.74). The 
same regional trends appeared (Table 7). First, al-Manar and al-Jadeed had no stories 
Table 3. Tone toward Hezbollah.
Newscast Sympathetic Neither/nor Critical
n (%) n (%) N (%)
ABC 0 0 37 49 39 51
NBC 6 7 32 40 43 53
CBS 4 5 35 47 35 47
CNN 1 1 76 72 29 27
CH2 4 5 36 40 49 55
Al-Manar 32 64 18 36 0 0
Al-Jadeed 40 69 16 28 2 3
LBC 8 15 35 65 11 20
Future 5 13 29 74 5 13
Al-Arabiya 3 8 32 82 4 10
Al-Jazeera 13 25 35 67 4 8
p = 0.0.
Table 4. Source of the first three sound bites.
Newscast Israel Lebanon* Hezbollah
n (%) n (%) n (%)
ABC 66 56 49 42 3 3
NBC 65 46 68 48 8 6
CBS 36 42 41 48 9 11
CNN 62 57 36 33 11 10
CH2 184 87 23 11 5 2
Al-Manar 3 10 19 66 7 24
Al-Jadeed 6 21 16 57 6 21
LBC 12 29 26 62 4 10
Future 1 2 55 95 2 3
Al-Arabiya 3 9 27 84 2 6
Al-Jazeera 11 33 16 49 6 18
p = 0.0.
*Excluding Hezbollah.
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blaming Hezbollah, and al-Jazeera had very few. US newscasts had an overwhelm-
ing majority of stories blaming Hezbollah, even more so than Israel’s CH2. As for 
Arab stations, the coverage varied, with three stations, LBC, al-Arabiya, and Future, 
offering significantly more stories blaming Hezbollah than the rest. On the other 
hand, all stories from al-Manar and al-Jadeed and almost all from al-Jazeera blamed 
Israel for causing the war, while the other three Arab stations somewhat differed but 
nevertheless assigned substantial blame to Israel. Most interestingly, not one story 
from all US newscasts assigned blame to Israel, although a quarter of Israel’s CH2 
itself did so.
Table 5. Tone of the first three sound bites toward Israel.
Newscast Sympathetic Neither/nor Critical
n (%) n (%) n (%)
ABC 42 29 63 43 42 29
NBC 50 31 66 41 45 28
CBS 30 26 59 51 27 23
CNN 40 29 60 43 40 29
CH2 86 46 65 35 35 19
Al-Manar 0 0 2 11 16 89
Al-Jadeed 4 17 0 0 20 83
LBC 9 19 13 28 25 53
Future 1 4 6 21 21 75
Al-Arabiya 4 17 9 39 10 44
Al-Jazeera 6 27 2 9 14 64
p = 0.0.
Table 6. Tone of the first three sound bites toward Hezbollah.
Newscast Sympathetic Neither/nor Critical
n (%) n (%) n (%)
ABC 8 7 65 53 49 40
NBC 17 14 60 48 48 38
CBS 13 12 60 56 34 32
CNN 15 11 73 55 45 34
CH2 17 12 65 46 59 42
Al-Manar 17 90 1 5 1 5
Al-Jadeed 14 54 2 8 10 39
LBC 5 17 12 41 12 41
Future 3 23 8 62 2 15
Al-Arabiya 4 29 7 50 3 21
Al-Jazeera 8 47 2 12 7 41
p = 0.0.
176 Media, War & Conflict 7(2)
Designating winner/loser
RQ1e assessed whether each news report explicitly portrayed Israel or Hezbollah as the 
winner or loser (K-alpha = 0.78). Only few regional trends emerged here (Table 8). First, 
all of the stories from al-Manar and al-Jadeed, and the vast majority from al-Jazeera, 
presented Hezbollah as the winner. Also a majority of stories from Future, LBC, and al-
Arabia also portrayed Hezbollah as the winner, but these were significantly fewer than 
what al-Manar, al-Jadeed, and Jazeera. US newscasts varied. A majority of stories from 
Table 7. Side blamed for causing the war.
Newscast Hezbollah Both Israel
n (%) n (%) n (%)
ABC 13 81 3 19 0 0
NBC 17 100 0 0 0 0
CBS 12 71 5 29 0 0
CNN 15 75 5 25 0 0
CH2 24 69 2 6 9 26
Al-Manar 0 0 0 0 6 100
Al-Jadeed 0 0 0 0 8 100
LBC 6 50 1 8 5 42
Future 4 29 1 7 9 64
Al-Arabiya 3 43 0 0 4 57
Al-Jazeera 1 8 0 0 12 92
p = 0.0.
Table 8. Side portrayed as winner/loser.
Station Hezbollah 
winner
Israel winner Both losers Both 
winners
n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%)
ABC 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 100
NBC 3 75 1 25 0 0 0 0
CBS 4 50 1 13 1 13 2 25
CNN 1 14 3 43 2 29 1 14
CH2 8 25 12 38 11 34 1 3
Al-Manar 39 100 0 0 0 0 0 0
Al-Jadeed 30 100 0 0 0 0 0 0
LBC 5 63 3 38 0 0 0 0
Future 4 67 1 17 1 17 0 0
Al-Arabiya 3 50 1 17 2 33 0 0
Al-Jazeera 9 82 1 9 1 9 0 0
p = 0.0.
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NBC and CBS portrayed Hezbollah as the winner, while only a minority from CH2 and 
CNN and none from ABC did so. On the other hand, al-Manar, al-Jadeed, and ABC had 
no stories presenting Israel as the winner, while CNN, CH2, and LBC had the most. The 
rest of the newscasts offered only one story each portraying Israel as winner.
Discussion
The content analysis of 963 TV news reports from 11 networks from the US, Israel, and 
the Arab world revealed significant differences and strong regional trends. The framing 
of Israeli’s CH2 was firmly in line with Israel’s interests. CH2 offered overwhelmingly 
more Israeli-centered meta-frames, news reports and sound bites predominantly sympa-
thetic to Israel and critical of Hezbollah, and sound bites mostly from Israeli sources. It 
largely blamed Hezbollah for causing the war and predominantly portrayed Israel as the 
winner. The exact opposite could be said about Hezbollah’s al-Manar, whose coverage 
was firmly aligned with Hezbollah’s interests.
The framing of the four US networks correlated almost perfectly with Israel’s CH2, 
sometimes even exceeding CH2 in its positive framing of Israel. Manifest was the alloca-
tion of blame; whereas CH2 offered at least some stories that blamed Israel for causing 
the war, not one story from US networks did so. In fact, they all had more coverage blam-
ing Hezbollah for causing the war than did CH2. In addition, US networks offered fewer 
stories and sound bites sympathetic to Hezbollah than CH2. The only inconsistent area 
was the depiction of the winner. Whereas NBC and CBS offered more framing than CH2 
that portrayed Hezbollah as the winner, ABC and CNN offered less.
The Arab networks broke into two camps. Al-Jadeed’s and al-Jazeera’s framing highly 
correlated with al-Manar’s, with one exception: they both offered a high proportion of 
sound bites critical of Hezbollah. Otherwise, both networks were strictly aligned with 
al-Manar’s coverage. Al-Jadeed sometimes even exceeded al-Manar in, for example, 
offering news reports sympathetic to Hezbollah. Conversely, Future, al-Arabiya, and 
LBC diverged from their Arab peers. Although they differed overall from Israeli and US 
networks and were closer to al-Manar, al-Jadeed, and al-Jazeera, they nevertheless were 
less supportive of Hezbollah, occasionally even offering framing mildly supportive of 
Israel. For example, they offered fewer sources from Hezbollah and more reports por-
traying Israel as the winner than did even some US networks. In comparison to their Arab 
peers, they offered significantly fewer reports and sound bites sympathetic to Hezbollah, 
more reports blaming Hezbollah for causing the war, and less framing that portrayed 
Hezbollah as the winner.
These findings are consistent with studies of Israeli media, which found their cover-
age to be staunchly and uncritically supportive of Israel (Dor et al., 2007; Gavriely-Nuri, 
2008; Gavriely-Nuri and Balas, 2010; Neiger et al., 2010). The results are also somewhat 
consistent with studies of US media, especially Mascagni (2008), who found the cover-
age promoted US foreign policy’s support of Israel and was highly negative towards 
Hezbollah, compared to the more modest conclusions of Cavari and Gabay (2010) and 
Bahador (2008), who found the coverage relatively balanced with a tilt in Israel’s favor. 
However, this study largely contradicts Kalb and Saivetz (2007: 50), who concluded that 
‘CNN tried to be balanced, and … ABC, CBS, and NBC were more critical of Israel than 
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of Hezbollah.’ However, the findings somewhat agree with Kalb and Saivetz’s conclu-
sion that Arab media favored Hezbollah, although, as noted earlier, this study found 
strong differences between Arab media.
If we imagine Israel’s CH2 on one extreme of the spectrum staunchly supporting Israel, 
and Hezbollah’s al-Manar on the other extreme firmly supporting Hezbollah (see Figure 1), 
we can easily see how US networks fall squarely on CH2’s side with little difference 
between them, sometimes even exceeding CH2 in supporting Israel’s interests. Whereas 
Arab channels, although generally falling on al-Manar’s side of the spectrum, were divided 
into two camps, al-Arabiya, LBC, and Future were less consistent in supporting Hezbollah 
and sometimes drew close to US and Israeli news framing. On the other hand, al-Jadeed’s 
and al-Jazeera’s framing was squarely in step with Hezbollah’s al-Manar.
The consistency between Israeli and US media framing is expected. Research has 
long established a correlation between foreign policy and news framing, particularly in 
the US (Lawrence, 2010). Nevertheless, it is interesting to see US networks sometimes 
exceeding Israeli media in supporting Israel, particularly when it came to allocating 
blame for causing the war, a matter that ties into justifying Israel’s actions, which US 
foreign policy and US media have consistently supported for decades, and may addi-
tionally be connected to the powerful pro-Israel lobby in the US (Mearsheimer and 
Walt, 2007).
Also interesting is the division between Arab networks, which reflects their geo- 
political alignments, economics, and sectarian affiliations. Qatar, owner of al-Jazeera, 
supported Hezbollah in that war and later donated generously to rebuild Lebanon. Its 
network has been a critic of Israeli policies in Palestine since its inception. In contrast, 
Saudi Arabia, the owner of al-Arabiya, was in a political conflict with Qatar. More 
importantly, Saudi supported the ‘March 14’ Lebanese political coalition that is opposed 
to Hezbollah and its ‘March 8’ coalition, which is backed by Syria and Iran and opposes 
Saudi and US influence in the region. As for the Lebanese networks, the Saudi-backed 
Hariri family, the owner of Future TV, led the most powerful Sunni political group in 
Lebanon (Future Movement) and was the most prominent member of the ‘March 14’ 
coalition and in contentious competition with the Shiite Hezbollah since 2005. LBC was 
historically controlled by a right-wing Christian group (Lebanese Forces), but after 1992 
it severed ties with the then-banned party and shifted alliances multiple times to ensure 
survival. Controlled since then by the former Lebanese Forces member turned 
Pro-HezbollahPro-Israel
Al-Arabiya
Future
LBCIsrael’s 
CH2
Hezbollah’s 
Al-Manar
ABC
CNN
NBC
CBS
Al-Jadeed
Al-Jazeera
Figure 1. Framing distribution along a pro-Israel/pro-Hezbollah continuum.
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businessman Pierre el-Daher, LBC enjoyed temporary protection by Saudi investors, 
most importantly Saudi prince and media tycoon al-Waleed bin Talal. The station since 
2005 supported the ‘March 14’ coalition. Finally, al-Jadeed TV, established by the com-
munist party, later sold to the businessman Tahseen Khayat and which continues to be 
staffed by many leftists and former communists has always been a steadfast critic of 
Israel, but has not shied away from occasionally criticizing Hezbollah. It tries to balance 
its cautious alignment with the ‘March 8’ coalition and its ties to Qatar, one of its major 
funders. Moreover, each of these stations follow distinct editorial policies and reflect 
divergent national journalistic cultures (Melki, 2008), which offers support to Archetti’s 
(2008) argument that the indexing hypothesis does not neatly fit news systems outside 
the US. This interplay between political, economic, and cultural factors and the news 
framing of these networks reconfirms the major differences between Arab media. Their 
divergent framing, particularly over the so-called unifying enemy (Israel), underlines the 
different ‘expressions and outcomes of power’ and distinct ‘web[s] of culture’ (Reese, 
2010: 18–19) that vary from one Arab state to another, and even within some pluralistic 
Arab states, such as Lebanon.
In contrast to Arab media’s divergent political economies, US media have largely 
been dominated by convergent structures, or in Herman and Chomsky’s (2002: 2) terms, 
a propaganda system characterized by a set of news filters that ensures ‘money and 
power are able to filter out the news fit to print, marginalize dissent, and allow the gov-
ernment and dominant private interests to get their messages across to the public’. This 
conception is most stark in the news framing of foreign policy matters, which rarely face 
any division or dissent among the political elite (Lawrence, 2010), particularly the issue 
of supporting Israel. Studies have established a strong correlation between news framing 
and elite framing in foreign affairs, ‘particularly in high-stakes contexts of war and inter-
national conflict’ (p. 267). Nevertheless, coverage of war entails multiple news frames 
and angles, such as justification of the war, portrayal of who won, prioritizing news 
sources, etc. As this study has established, news framing of blame, justification, and 
defining the culprit entail the greatest contrast, particularly for US media that unequivo-
cally justified Israel’s actions and pretext by only blaming Hezbollah for causing the war, 
despite Israeli media themselves somewhat wavering on this issue. On the other hand, 
US media framing significantly diverged from government framing in defining who won 
the war. Israel’s unexpected loss confounded US policy makers and briefly opened the 
door for journalists to independently frame the news.
As a result of this framing, audiences of the studied media networks watched largely 
different versions of this war. US audiences mainly watched a war between a justified and 
legitimate Israeli ‘ally’ and an illegitimate Hezbollah that received the brunt of the net-
work’s negative coverage but nevertheless in the end was able to win – or at least not lose.
Israeli audiences, as judged by Channel 2’s coverage, received a similar but invariably 
more in-depth and nuanced picture. However, unlike US audiences, Israeli audiences at 
least received some questioning of the rationality behind this war, questioning that 
increased towards the end of the war (Neiger et al., 2010).
Arab – including Lebanese – audiences received the opposite story: a justified 
Hezbollah resistance movement that has continued to resist Israeli oppression since it 
invaded Lebanon in 1982, in addition to a ‘divine and historic’ victory for the Arab 
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Hezbollah over the Zionist state that had humiliated full-fledged Arab armies in one bat-
tle after another for over half a century. The rift between Arab media did not likely chal-
lenge this narrative during the war, mainly because the more staunchly supportive Manar, 
al-Jadeed, and al-Jazeera had overwhelmingly more audiences than the less supportive 
LBC, Future TV, and al-Arabiya (Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development, 2006). 
But one cannot ignore the coverage of the latter group and their dedicated audiences, 
especially inside Lebanon, and especially around the end of the war. For example, during 
the last few days of the war (around 15 August), Hezbollah tried hard to advance a nar-
rative that celebrated the historic victory and focused on the enormous rebuilding effort, 
while its local opponents, for instance Future TV, kept the camera lens focused on the 
vast destruction, loss of life, and economic devastation.
Finally, these findings encourage further investigation into the various areas of war 
framing, particularly the ‘unexpected events’ that can potentially balance the playing 
field in favor of independent journalism (Lawrence, 2010: 275). One example is the 30 
July Israeli airstrike on Qana that killed many civilians and temporarily turned US media 
coverage against Israel (Bahador, 2008). Another example is Hezbollah’s 6 August 
rocket attack on the Israeli town Kfar Giladi, which killed 12 Israeli soldiers and was 
described as Israel’s ‘bloodiest day’ (McCarthy, 2006). Further analysis of how these 
events affected international news could better inform us about the implications and 
characteristics of news framing of unexpected events. Moreover, further research that 
more closely replicates Archetti’s (2008) design could shed more light on the merits of 
the indexing hypothesis outside the US.
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Appendix
Codebook (includes only variables relevant to this article)
1. The date the story aired.
2. The name of news network:
a. ABC
b. NBC
c. CBS
d. CNN
e. Channel 2 (Israel)
f. Jazeera
g. Arabia
h. Manar
i. Jadeed
j. Future TV
k. LBC
3. Placement of the story in the newscast: (English coders, see rundown for answer. 
Arabic coders, see grid for answer)
a. 1st story
b. 2nd story
c. 3rd story
d. 4th story
e. 5th story
f. 6th story
g. 7th story
h. 8th story
i. 9th story
j. 10th to last
4. Length of the story (start timing when the Anchor starts talking until the reporter or 
the anchor ends the story):
a. Less than 30 seconds
b. 0:30 – 0:59 seconds
c. 1:00 – 1:30 minutes
d. 1:31 – 2:00 minutes
e. 2:01 – 2:30 minutes
f. 2:31 – 3:00 minutes
g. More than 3:00 minutes
----------------------------------------------------------------------
The following sections deal with frames used throughout the story.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
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5. Which Meta-Frame dominates the story? (We are not analyzing bias here. Look for 
the dominant meta-frame. Meta-Frames ask: from whose POINT-OF-VIEW is the 
story told? Who is the subject in the story? From whose perspective is the story-
teller telling the story? Examples:
– International: Global demonstrations broke out over the war between Israel and 
Hezbollah…
– Lebanon: The Lebanese president called Israel’s attack on Beirut Airport a 
crime of war.
– Israel: Israel pounds Lebanon with missiles and vows to continue attacking 
until Hezbollah is disarmed.
– US: American citizens stranded in Lebanon … President Bush calls on the 
fighting parties to continue fighting …
a. Internationally centered meta-frame.
b. Israel centered meta-frame.
c. Lebanon centered meta-frame.
d. US centered meta-frame.
e. Other (specify):
----------------------------------------------------------------------
This section deals with the framing or portrayal of the main sides of this war: Israel, 
Lebanon and Hezbollah. It also includes some questions about the framing of Iran, 
Syria and the US, which were frequently mentioned as the players behind the fighting 
parties.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
6. The dominant tone of the story was explicitly Sympathetic/Critical of Israel (Focus 
on the dominant tone and give priority to the reporter’s lead if there was more than 
one tone. Ignore sound bites in this question. If it was not clear, choose ‘neither/
nor’)
a. Sympathetic to Israel
b. Neither/Nor (Neutral/Balanced)
c. Critical of Israel
d. Not applicable, Israel was not mentioned.
7. The dominant tone of the story was explicitly Sympathetic/Critical of Hezbollah 
(ignore sound bites in this question. Focus on the dominant tone and give priority to 
the reporter’s lead if there was more than one tone. If it was not clear, choose 
‘Neither/Nor’).
a. Sympathetic to Hezbollah
b. Neither/Nor (Neutral/Balanced)
c. Critical of Hezbollah
d. Not applicable, Hezbollah was not mentioned.
8. Who was mainly and explicitly blamed for starting or causing the war? (Look for 
sentences that explicitly say that one side started the war)
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a. Hezbollah
b. Israel
c. Both sides were equally blamed
d. Not applicable, nothing about blame was mentioned or neither side was blamed
9. Who was explicitly portrayed as winning the war (or the winner of the war) and who 
was explicitly portrayed as losing the war (or the loser of the war)? (Ignore sound 
bites in this question. Look for sentences that explicitly say that one side won and/
or lost.)
a. Hezbollah was the loser, Israel the winner
b. Both were the losers
c. Both were the winners
d. Israel was the loser, Hezbollah the winner
e. Not applicable, no mention of losing or winning
----------------------------------------------------------------------
This section deals with sound bites and interviews the reporter used in the story, whether 
it was from a politician, expert, soldier, civilian or other.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
10. How many sound bites were used in the whole story? (Translations of sound bites 
count as sound bites).
a. Zero
b. 1–to–4
c. 5–to–10
d. 11–to–15
e. 16 or more
11. Was each of the first three sound bites explicitly sympathetic, neutral or critical of 
Israel? (If too close to call, choose neutral.)
a. First sound bite:
i. No sound bite or no mention of Israel
ii. Sympathetic
iii. Neutral
iv. Critical
b. Second sound bite:
i. No sound bite or no mention of Israel
ii. Sympathetic
iii. Neutral
iv. Critical
c. Third sound bite:
i. No sound bite or no mention of Israel
ii. Sympathetic
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iii. Neutral
iv. Critical
12. What are the countries of the people speaking in each of the first three sound bites?
a. Israel
b. Lebanon (but not a Hezbollah source)
c. Hezbollah
d. No sound bite
e. Unknown
f. Other (specify)
13. Was each of the first three sound bites explicitly sympathetic, neutral or critical of 
Hezbollah? (If too close to call, choose neutral.)
a. First sound bite:
i. No sound bite or no mention of Hezbollah
ii. Sympathetic
iii. Neutral
iv. Critical
b. Second sound bite:
i. No sound bite or no mention of Hezbollah
ii. Sympathetic
iii. Neutral
iv. Critical
c. Third sound bite:
i. No sound bite or no mention of Hezbollah
ii. Sympathetic
iii. Neutral
iv. Critical
Note: The original codebook included 32 variables. Only 13 variables relevant to the 
study were included here, and some more detailed instructions were removed.
